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1 Introduction: Purposive Actors and the Autodynamics of 
Social Networks 
Empirical studies on the history of West German space policy present us with 
a variety of actors faced with trouble who sometimes manage to cope, and 
sometimes do not. However, most examples analyzed in this chapter fit nei-
ther into the pattem of total success nor into that of total failure. Most fre-
quently we find what will be referred to here as successful failure or unin-
tended success, indicating that the key actors were usually able to attain (at 
least some of) the goals they bad set for themselves, but also produced effects 
which were either unintended, suboptimal or, in the long run, even counter-
productive. 
This chapter attempts to explain the phenomenon of successful failure by 
analyzing the mutual interrelations of coping activities and troublesome activi-
ties of different actors. An interactive approach will be developed - based 
on the concept of the purposive actor borrowed from Max Weber, James 
Coleman, Humberto Maturana and others - which claims that trouble is a 
cause of coping reactions and that, in addition, coping activities are a trigger 
of new trouble (either for the acting unit or for other coplayers). 1 Thus, cop-
ing and trouble-inducing activities cannot be distinguished systematically; the 
distinction depends on the view of the respective actor and the interdependen-
E. Peter Gennain's translation of the first draft is gratefully acknowledged. 
Cf. Weber (1985); Coleman (1990); Maturana (1987). See also Stucke and Musselin! 
Vilkas in this volume. 
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cies generated by the interplay of trouble, coping and, again, trouble- some-
times an endless chain. One main argument presented here is: It is necessary 
to create a notion of the actor in order to understand why he or she reacts 
(to trouble), acts (strategically, for example, to avoid trouble), and finally gets 
into trouble or creates trouble for other actors. 
It would, however, be misleading to conceptualize social interaction as 
a simple sequence of trouble (as a trigger of coping reactions), coping activi-
ties (as a source ofnew trouble) and so on, being produced by different actors 
who are isolated from each other. The success of actors' strategies ( of which 
coping strategies are a subgroup) depends to a considerable extent upon estab-
lishing a consensus of interest among strategically acting actors, which in turn 
is manifested in the creation and stabilization of a social network. Such inter-
est-based social networks form the foundation for social and technical innova-
tions; they are also the social space enabling the participating partners to 
exercise a mutual influence on each other. For our analysis, the fact that actor 
networks can develop autodynamics and thus become a source of trouble in 
their own right is very important. 2 An actor network represents an emergent 
phenomenon obeying its own rules over which none of the players exercises 
exclusive control. Maintenance of the network can turn into a serious con-
straint when further participation comes to depend upon the very existence 
of the network. In this case, the actions of the participants are more strongly 
determined by the requirements of the network than by their own individual 
interests. At this point, questioning the sociallogic of the network increasing-
ly comes to mean questioning oneself. The alternative becomes: continue 
playing the game or quit. 
Although they are a result of previous coping ~ctivities, social networks 
can develop internal dynamics whose effects may provoke ambivalent or even 
negative feelings from the participating actors. Central protagonists begin to 
view themselves as victims of a process that has led to suboptimal results 
for all participants, although they all have played a prominent role in creating 
it. Therefore, two Ievels of trouble can be distinguished analytically: the first 
resulting from actors' uncertainty about the future and their doubts about 
being able to succeed at implementing the goals they have set for themselves, 
the second resulting from the (sometimes very rigid) constraints social net-
2 Readers will note that my notion of an actor network differs from the notion developed 
by Latour (1988) and Callon ( 1991 ). 
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works can exercise. This second Ievel of uncertainty depends upon the proba-
bility that a social arrangement will work whose function is to facilitate the 
success of the strategies at the first Ievel. In order to understand the interplay 
of trouble and coping, we must not only develop a notion of the purposive 
actor, but also comprehend the (auto)dynamics of social networks and the 
mechanism of self-production of social constraints induced when strategically 
acting actors form a network. 
A case study from the history of West German space policy will serve 
to illustrate the hypothesis sketched (very briefly) above.3 After explaining 
the function of the private rocket and space associations and their contribu-
tions to the revitalization of the policy field of "space flight" (Section 2), the 
analysis concentrates on the extrauniversity aeronautics (later: aerospace) re-
search institutes and their contribution to the creation ofthat policy field dur-
ing the period from 1945 to 1965 (Section 3). After a short summary of the 
case study, theoretical conclusions will be discussed (Section 4). 
2 Early Attempts to Reestablish the Policy Field of "Space 
Flight" after 1945 
To set the stage for the case study, the development of German space policy 
will be reconstructed up to the moment when the aeronautics research insti-
tutes became the key actor. As indicated above, this history shall be presented 
as a sequence of successful failures and unintended successes which can be 
related to the interplay of trouble and coping. 
2.1 Hobby Rocket Constructors in the Immediate Postwar Period 
In 1945, the space (as weil as the aeronautics) research community was in 
big trouble. Research activities had come to a standstill because of the de-
struction of many of the facilities, the Iack of resources and the (generally) 
prohibitive policy of the Allied occupation forces. Immediately after the war, 
3 For a more detailed analysis of this case, see Weyer (1993a). 
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different members of the community started an - uncoordinated - series of 
attempts to preserve as much as they could of the still-existing potential in 
aeronautics and rocket research. The active researchers remaining in Germany 
made quite a variety of efforts, employing all manner of indirect schemes 
to ensure that a certain continuity was maintained. In the late 1940s, the 
rocketry community reorganized itself, although the only possible form of 
institutionalization available to it was private societies such as the Society 
for Space Research (Gesellschaft für Weltraumforschung, GfW), founded in 
1948, or the Work Group on Rocketry (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Raketentech-
nik, AFRA; later DAFRA), founded in 1952. For these societies, developing 
small rockets not only had the important function of demonstrating the self-
confidence of the rocketry community, but also represented a suitable method 
for testing the Iimits of tolerance of the Allied occupying powers. Nonethe-
less, despite its importance for the revival of rocket construction, the DAFRA 
quickly sank into insignificance during the mid-1950s: The phase of private 
rocket construction as a hobby ended when political agencies began to become 
interested in this technology and rocket research was institutionalized in the 
form of federal big science centers. The DAFRA was transformed within a 
few years into the Hermann-Oberth-Gesellschaft, a private association of 
rocket research "veterans," which is still in existence but has played at best 
a marginal role in the policy field of "space flight." 
2.2 The Development of Big Science 
The initial phase characterized by the private rocket and space societies ended 
between 1952 and 1954, when the GtW" was able! to convince the Federal 
Ministry of Transport (Bundesverkehrsministerium, BMV) to supportrocket 
research and to set up the first institute for rocket research in the Federal 
Republic, the Research Institute for the Physics of Jet Propulsion (For-
schungsinstitut für Physik der Strahlantriebe, FPS), in Stuttgart in 1954. This 
event, which occurred before the Allied forces lifted their ban on research 
and two years before the first nuclear research institutes were founded, 
marked the beginning of the Strategie interaction between science and politics 
in the Federal Republic. The fact that the BMV successfully reclaimed federal 
responsibility in questions of research and deliberately oriented the founding 
of the FPS along the lines of big science reveals that the contours of a new 
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policy area were beginning to take shape. In the face of this development the 
private construction of small rockets was quickly pushed into the background. 
But this rapid development had only been made possible by the GfW's 
prior occupation of the field through its public rehabilitation of space and 
rocket technology and its ( coping) strategy of informal preinstitutionalization: 
It had paved the way for the BMV. It was primarily due to the GtW"'s deliber-
ately pursued policy of integrating German rocketry into international space 
and rocket research that West Germany was able to reenter the field in this 
way- just a few years after the last German V-2 rocket had been fired. This 
policy included systematic efforts to improve the image of rocket technology; 
its peaceful nature was propagated tirelessly by GfW protagonists Heinz 
Gartmann, Heinz-Hermann Koelle and Eugen Sänger. A quote by Sänger 
reveals the argumentative tightrope walk they took: "Rockets are not only 
weapons, but also instruments of peaceful research" (Beiträge zur Weltraum-
forschung und Weltraumfahrt 111949: 14, italics added). For the Germans to 
get a new start in rocket research, presenting such an image was absolutely 
essentiaL In addition, the phrase coined by Sänger, "Raumfahrt als Verkehr" 
(space flight as transport) had a high legitimatory value for the federal trans-
poft ministry. 
Setting up the FPS was undoubtedly an auspicious success, with effects 
going far beyond the single case. The social network created by the GfW and 
the BMV played an essential role not only in the establishment of "big sci-
ence" in Germany, but also in constituting the policy field "research and 
technology," which helped to legitimate state intervention in research. At the 
same time, the network also produced constraints which became evident, for 
example, at the beginning of the 1960s when debates about a European space 
program started: The West German govemment sought at all costs to avoid 
creating the impression that it was pursuing rocket construction as a strictly 
national policy, possibly even for military purposes. This was, however, pre-
cisely the program that Eugen Sänger and his FPS were pursuing. Sänger 
refused to recognize practical constraints on his work, even accepting the 
lucrative offer of the Egyptian govemment to participate in the development 
of medium-range missiles in Egypt. This resulted in the collapse of the net-
work after only a few years. The remains of his institute passed over into the 
hands of the largest aeronautics research institute. The remains ofhis institute 
passed over into the hands of the largest aeronautics research institute. The 
BMV lost responsibility for rocketry and space research, and later for aviation 
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in general as well, disappearing altogether from the research policy area of 
West Gennan rocket research which it had created in the 1950s - and which 
was to bear the BMV's starnp for some time to come. The social and political 
structures created during this phase (to which Sänger had refused to yield) 
remained; other actors entered upon the scene, pocketed the profits and con-
tinued the game on another Ievel, until they, too, foundered due to their very 
successes. 
3 The Battle for Autonomy and Control of Extrauniversity 
Aeronautics Research 
In addition to what could be called the FPS precedent, it was the parallel 
developments in aeronautics research which were primarily responsible for 
the emergence of the policy field of "space flight" and the development of 
federal authority for technology policy. In order to understand the interplay 
of trouble and coping here, we will look at this case in detail. 
3.1 The First Step: Informal Reinstitutionalization as a Coping 
Strategy during the Immediate Postwar Period 
After 1945, the aeronautics research institutes - most of which had been 
founded at the beginning of the century or under the Naziregime- werein 
maximum trouble: Aeronautics research was prohibited by Allied law, the 
facilities were either destroyed or confiscated, and the possibility of resuming 
research and development activities seemed to have receded into the distant 
future. In this situation, different groups of fonner members of the Nazi aero-
nautics research community developed a coping strategy to survive the imme-
diate postwar period and to get things Started again in what they hoped would 
be "better times." 
This coping strategy was facilitated by the fact that the big science centers 
of aeronautics research in Gennany had always had the legal status of 
eingetragene Vereine (e.V.), a special construction often adopted by private 
associations such as sport clubs or scientific societies in order to avoid being 
taxed for their activities. From a legal standpoint, the aeronautics research 
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institutes in Nazi Gennany had not been state-run big science centers (like 
the NACA- later NASA- in the United States), but private organizations 
with an extraordinarily high share of external funding. This enabled them to 
continue certain activities after 1945 without coming into conflict with Allied 
law.4 
A second factor which facilitated the survival and subsequent reconstruc-
tion of the aeronautics research institutes was their close connections to a 
number of technical universities. Friedrich Seewald, for example, who was 
a leading member of the Gennan Institute for Aeronautics Research (Deutsche 
Versuchsanstalt für Luftfahrt e. V., DVL), had been a professor in Aachen 
since 1941. He held onto this position after 1945, managing to gather together 
a small staff of fonner DVL people in Aachen and even to reorganize small-
scale aeronautics research at his university institute, which he used during 
the early 1950s to demonstrate to the public that it was necessary to recon-
struct the big science centers. This coping strategy of using the technical uni-
versities as a location where aeronautics research could go into a "holding 
pattern" was very successful - Friedrich Seewald and his DVL were ready 
to get started when aeronautics research was pennitted again in 1954. 
But all these activities would have failed if the American occupying power 
had not tolerated and even promoted the maintenance and reconstruction of 
such aeronautics associations as the DVL and their research institutes. In the 
immediate postwar period, British and US agencies gave research contracts 
to various DVL institutes in southern Gennany, which expired in late 1945 
or mid-1946. And, by keeping plunderers out of the facilities, the US authori-
ties ensured that documentation work on Nazi aeronautics and rocket research 
(which the Allied forces considered very valuable) could be conducted without 
interference. What was most important for further developments, however, 
was the certification given by the Office of the Military Government (US) 
in 1947 confinning "that the association 'Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Luft-
fahrt' does not belong to the organizations which have been dissolved by the 
Allied Control Council," even though "every activity in the area of aeronau-
tics research still remains forbidden" ( quoted in Gennan in Bruders 1962: 
50, translation by the author). 
To sum up, the coping strategy of an infonnal reinstitutionalization of 
extrauniversity aeronautics research in postwar Gennany pursued by Friedrich 
4 Cf. Trischier (1992). 
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Seewald and bis colleagues was based on three elements, each indispensable 
for the subsequent success: the legality of (non-research-oriented) engagement 
in aeronautics subjects in private associations, the possibility to survive and 
to reorganize research at the technical universities and provide "holding pat-
terns" for parts of the aeronautics community, and, finally, the tolerant and 
encouraging policy of the US Military Government. It was only due to these 
circumstances that the scientists even bad a chance to resume their activities 
as quickly and vigorously as they did. But neither the circumstances nor the 
strategies and intentions of the key actors suffice to explain the remarkable 
success of their coping strategy. The decisive element in what turned out to 
be a success was the creation of an actor network consisting of aeronautics 
research associations and West German federal states (Länder). 
3.2 The Second Step: Networking with the Länderas a Coping 
Strategy in the Reconstruction Period 
From the point of view of the Länder, the coping activities of the aeronautics 
researchers and, more importantly, the informal reinstitutionalization of the 
research institutes bad created an attractive opportunity for politicians to link 
up with aeronautics research in order to exploit the political benefits of (what 
later came tobe called) high-tech policy. Leo Brandt, Undersecretary in the 
Ministry of Economics of North Rhine-Westphalia, considered aeronautics 
to be a key technology and "an important pacemaker of modern technology," 
and therefore assigned it "a pivotal role in a modern· economy" (Brandt 1954: 
35, translation by the author). With this concept of t~chnology policy, Brandt 
actually became the first research minister in West Germany, although this 
policy field bad not yet been formally created. The aeronautics associations 
profited very strongly from bis activities, which not only protected the steps 
toward a reconstruction ofthe research institutes before 1955, but also provid-
ed the funds urgently needed to build new facilities. On January 23, 1952, 
the parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia decided to fund the construction 
of aeronautics research institutes at the Mülheim airport and in Bad Godes-
berg. This bold measure not only promoted the recommencement of aeronau-
tics research in West Germany, but also brought a completely new branch 
of research into the region. This decision bad far-reaching consequences: The 
German Aerospace Research and Test Institute (Deutsche Forschungs- und 
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Versuchsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt, DFVLR; now DLR), which came 
into being in 1969 as a merger of all aerospace research institutes of West 
Germany, is still situated in North Rhine-Westphalia (in Cologne). Without 
doubt this can be regarded as a political success, irrespective of the critical 
question of whether state funds should not better have been directed into other 
fields of research. 
The creation of an actor network in which different actor groups with 
various interests and motives link up and build a coalition thus can be regard-
ed as the crucial factor influencing the success or failure of a coping strategy. 
A major social innovationsuch as the reestablishment of aeronautics research 
in West Germany as weH as the subsequent technical innovations could only 
be achieved by networking between politics (which regards aeronautics re-
search as a resource for successful politics) and science (which regards tech-
nology policy as a resource for successful research). 
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, networks are not only the 
foundation of success; they can also develop their own dynamics and thus 
become an independent source of new trouble. For the research institutes, the 
fact that aeronautics facilities were scattered around the country - a result 
of wartime and postwar necessities - became a source of trouble in the long 
run. Some facilities were located in Bavaria, the institutes having been moved 
there from Berlin when the bombings became too heavy toward the end of 
the war. After the war, the Bavarian authorities began to imitate North Rhine-
Westphalia's new technology policy and supported the reconstruction of for-
mer DVL institutes at Oberpfaffenhofen, which is still an important site for 
German space activities. There are also institutes in Baden-Württemberg and 
Lower Saxony. The old facilities of Berlin-Adlershof, finally, are the most 
recent addition since reunification to this complex of regionally scattered 
institutes with sometimes divergent interests, which the central administration 
in Cologne was hardly able to "govern" during conflict-ridden phases. But 
this trouble did not arise until the 1960s - in the 1950s, the aeronautics re-
search institutes were deeply satisfied that they could start up their work again 
with the help of the Länder, which provided the subsidies the federal govern-
ment could not contribute for legal and legitimatory reasons. 
So the aeronautics community had intentionally produced a suboptimal 
result which can be interpreted as a failure of a successful coping strategy. 
But the Länder also became victims of their own strategy when the financial 
burden of big science in the aeronautics field grew. In the first phase, when 
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the institutes were to be reconstructed, the promotion of aeronautics was 
hardly expensive. But in 1956, at the latest, it became evident that the Länder 
would soon be reaching their limit financially: The DVL demanded a sum 
of 60 million DM (tobe spread over five years) for the building of new re-
search and test facilities, in addition to the regular annual budget. Only a few 
years after the successful reinstallation of aeronautics research under the 
responsibility of different Länder govemments and the parallel creation of 
early predecessors of technology policy, the Länder got into trouble, which 
in the end can be regarded as a result of their attempts to seize opportunities 
as they arose. 
Just as the social network was in danger of weakening or even collapsing, 
a new actor, the Federal Ministry of Transport (BMV), stepped in, took ad-
vantage of the opportunities that were opening up and finally reconstructed 
the network to such an extent that the Länder lost their formerly dominant 
position and were relegated to the periphery of the policy field. This case 
provides an example for the thesis that coping activities can have three differ-
ent (sometimes interrelated) effects: 
- They may help to overcome trouble, 
- they may produce opportunities which another actor can take advantage 
of, resulting in an actor network, and finally 
they may produce new trouble for the actors concemed. 
The Federal Minister of Transport from 1949 to 1966, Hans-Christoph See-
bohm, who regarded both air and space transport as his domain, had been 
interested in promoting aeronautics research since the early 1950s. Two fac-
tors restricted his activities, however: Allied occupation laws, and West Ger-
man constitutionallaw, which rendered the West derman federal govemment 
relatively weak compared to the Länder govemments in the fields of culture, 
education and science. One of the few niches left to Seebohm was the super-
vision and control of technical systems - a classical sphere of responsibility 
for every central govemment.5 But his aim was to establish aeronautics re-
search in institutes directly responsible to the federal govemment (Ressort-
forschung). From the point of view of the transport ministry, a commitment 
to aeronautics research was a suitable coping strategy to overcome the re-
5 Cf. Lundgreen et al. (1986); Stucke (1989). 
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strictions of the competencies of the federal authorities - with the long-term 
objective of state-controlled research. 
Wielding a fair amount of power thanks to the funds at its disposal, the 
BMV very soon achieved a central position in the policy field, which it imme-
diately used to call for a "reorganization of aeronautics research" (Seebohm 
1953: 11)- i.e. coordinating and eventually merging together the aeronautics 
institutes, which were still small and regionally scattered at this point. The 
irrefutable argument in favor of such a reorganization was the foreseeably 
enormous costs of aeronautics research, especially if it was to continue to be 
conducted in six independent institutes- each of which would soon be requir-
ing its own wind tunnel, a test stand and other expensive devices. For the 
aeronautics institutes, which had just overcome their previous problems, real 
troublewas now looming, since it became obvious that the (absolutely neces-
sary) federal funding at the same time entailed political control of science 
and political intervention into the research process. But it must be noted that 
the transport ministry did not achieve its objectives, either, since it paid a high 
price in order to get the research institutes to accept the coordination of their 
work - maybe a higher price than it would have had to pay for the funding 
of uncoordinated research. Nevertheless, its policy can be regarded as an 
important contribution to a process which culminated in the establishment 
of the first federal research ministry in 1962. 
3.3 The Third Step: Coping with Network Dynamics 
The coping reactions of the aeronautics research institutes to these political 
initiatives were stimulated mainly by the prospect of losing their autonomy, 
which had been considerable during the period of Länder sponsorship and 
even during the Nazi era, the so-called 'golden age' of aeronautics research 
in Germany, when funds had been plentiful and political intervention had been 
either chaotic or- contrary to the common perception of the Naziregime-
even nonexistent The institutes were now in an ambivalent Situation: Their 
consolidation and expansion to an intemationally competitive Ievel could only 
be achieved with a strong partner (especially financially) in politics. Hence, 
the old network created with the Länder became less important, while a new 
network with federal authorities had to be created. This strategy was, in fact, 
extremely successful: The aeronautics research institutes enjoyed a period of 
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rapid expansion which was followed by another developmentalleap triggered 
by the European space program in the early 1960s, so that in 1965 the DVL 
had reached the size (in terms of staff) it had once had in 1935 - undoubtedly 
a great success. But the risks of that networking strategy were clear. The 
principle of independence of the different research institutes was constantly 
threatened, until in the mid-1960s their position became so weak that resis-
tance became useless; in 1969 the fusion of the aeronautics institutes could 
finally take place. The German Aerospace Research and Test Institute 
(DFVLR; now DLR), founded as a central organization, was much easier for 
the central political authorities to control than the six independent institutes, 
each of which had been sponsored and protected by "its" respective Länder 
government. 
The period from 1953 (the first announeerneut of an interventionist policy 
by Seebohm) to 1969 (the fusion of the aeronautics research institutes) can 
be viewed as a continuing defensive battle in which different coping strategies 
- some active, some reactive - were developed and carried out that led, how-
ever, to a result the research institutes judged negatively. The main obstacle 
making failure almost inevitable was the fact that the aeronautics research 
institutes were repeatedly confronted with new trouble before they had man-
aged to solve the old. This may explain why they did not react to the political 
disturbances in the same way an independent observer - living, say, in the 
1990s- might suggest they should have, but adopted strategies which, at least 
viewed with the benefit of hindsight, had to fail. 
The first step in this struggle with politics was the creation of an indepen-
dent representation of the interests of extrauniversity aeronautics research. 
The Association for Aeronautkai Seiences (Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft 
für Luftfahrt, WGL), founded in 1952, played an important role in reorganiz-
ing the aeronautics community- by publicly promoting a new peaceful image 
of aeronautics research in order to justify their petitions for political support 
-andin reintegrating German aeronautics research into the international com-
munity. The most important function of the WGL wastobe a competent part-
ner for the political actor, the Federal Minister of Transport, who had indicat-
ed as early as 1951 that he had at his disposal a small amount of money which 
could be spent on aeronautics subjects and that he needed scientific advice 
in setting priorities for the distribution of these funds. In 1953, the Committee 
on Aeronautics Research (Ausschuß für Luftfahrtforschung, AfL) was founded 
as a subsection of the WGL, serving simultaneously, however, as an advisory 
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board for the transport ministry. This was the first case of institutionalized 
policy advising in the R&D sector in West Germany, which proved to be use-
ful for both partners concemed. For the transport minisrry, the institutionali-
zation of a hybrid organization between politics and science was the first step 
toward a central coordination and control of R&D (here in the field of aero-
nautics), whereas the aeronautics community, represented by the WGL, suc-
ceeded in obtaining quasi-monopolistic access to the political key actor in 
its respective field. Every research proposal, be it from WGL members or 
not, now had to pass through the hands of the WGL president, who- not sur-
prisingly - had also become chairman of the advisory committee AfL. 
Nevertheless, the WGL could not serve as a strong representative of the 
interests of extrauniversity aeronautics research, since this umbrella organiza-
tion of the West German aeronautics community encompassed heterogeneaus 
groups from different branches of aeronautical science and industry. In addi-
tion, the WGL had to fulfill bargaining functions in the interplay of politics 
and science which was just beginning to take place. It became especially 
obvious that the aeronautics research institutes were in need of a representa-
tive organization of their own when the transpoft ministry began to call more 
insistently for a coordination of research planning and made its willingness 
to fund the expansion of the research institutes dependent on their willingness 
to cooperate. In March 1955, three out of the six institutes therefore founded 
the Community of Interests of the Aeronautics Research Institutes (Interes-
sengemeinschaft der Luftfahrtforschungsanstalten) - the weakest form of 
cooperation they could have chosen. The reason for this half-hearted move 
was each institute's separate fear of losing its autonomy. Once again, the 
success of a previous coping strategy-leading to a network between aeronau-
tics research and the transport ministry - became the source of still greater 
trouble, for the BMV's objective was clear: the fusion of all research insti-
tutes, the creation of one big science center, and the central political control 
of aeronautics research. Obviously, the establishment of this weak Community 
of Interests was the wrong reaction to this trouble. 
The aeronautics research institutes continued the coping game, the ration-
ale of which was to satisfy the transport ministry by (at least) symbolically 
uniting the institutes and at the same time letting each of the institutes be able 
to keep its traditional autonomy. This was difficult to achieve because the 
smaller institutes suspected that their larger fellow institutes, especially the 
big DVL, might use this game to swallow them. After long deliberations, the 
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High Council of Aeronautics Research Institutes ( Präsidialrat der Luftfahrt-
forschungsanstalten), made up of representatives of all six institutes, was 
founded in October 1956. They now had a stronger representation of interests, 
but the political actors were still dissatisfied because the unclear legal con-
struction of the Präsidialratmade it impossible to use this organization either 
as an instrument for the distribution of federal funds (as the legal construction 
of the eingetragener Verein would have allowed) or as an instrument for the 
political control of science. Thus, the political actors insisted that the High 
Council be reconstituted as a "body corporate" (DGF 1965: 133). The game 
continued during the following years, but the position of the research institutes 
became increasingly weaker because they were in a tight financial spot. In 
April 1959, they founded the German Association for Aeronautics (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft fiir Flugwissenschaften e. V., DGF), which all extrauniversity 
research institutes in the field of aeronautics joined. The DGF served as an 
umbrella organization which distributed the federal funds among the members 
and as the bargaining partner toward politics. The statute of the DGF shows 
that this body was constructed as an instrument of political control of science. 
The aeronautics research institutes feit they were the losers of this game; 
their coping strategy had obviously failed. Their objective during the 1950s 
had been more funding for aeronautics research; now they received more 
funds than they had ever dreamed of, but only in combination with political 
intervention and control of their research work. But also from the point of 
view of politics, the result of this game was suboptimal, since the federal 
actor (first the transpoft ministry, later the science ministry) paid a high price 
for the unification of the research institutes. The costs of research soared, but 
now politics was obliged to shoulder its new responsibilities, which was not 
easy, since the large DGF, later the DFVLR, and: finally, the DLR proved 
to be difficult to control. 
3.4 The Fourth Step: Coping with the Space Age 
The outcome of the battle for autonomy and control of extrauniversity aero-
nautics research was not predictable at the moment when the real trouble 
began, which finally kicked the transport ministry out of the game, brought 
new actors in, and led to an (unintended and unwanted) accelerated expansion 
of the research institutes. In 1960, the first initiatives were launched by Great 
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Britain and France toset up a European space organization. The federal gov-
ernment of West Germany began to deal with this new subject at the end of 
1960 and, more intensively, in early 1961. For German federal politics, space 
flight was an accidental opportunity which improved its ability to cope with 
the trouble of its restricted sovereignty in comparison with the neighboring 
European countfies and, domestically, with the trouble of its relatively weak 
position in comparison with the Länder. This coping strategy, however, could 
only be successful if anational base for the planned participation in European 
space flight was at band. Now, the early initiatives of the transport ministry 
and the aeronautics and rocket societies aimed at reinstitutionalizing aeronau-
tics research finally paid off. But what might have been considered the great-
est success in the history of West German aeronautics research was regarded 
as the most threatening trouble the aeronautics community had been confront-
ed with since 1945, because the federal government's new initiatives to pro-
mote space research - in dimensions inconceivable only a few years earlier 
- inevitably entailed its calling for a fundamental shift of research priorities 
from aeronautics to space flight and from basic to applied research. Besides, 
it was foreseeable that the trend toward a political control of science would 
intensify if research priorities now had to be negotiated not only between 
different national research institutes, but also between various European states 
with disparate (political, scientific, economic, partly also military) interests 
in space flight. The game the aeronautics community had so enthusiastically 
initiated was about to slip out of its control due to the powerful autodynamics 
that had developed. At this point, the community would have preferred to 
stop the "film" rather than to continue playing its role, since it no Ionger had 
any control over the script. 
The aeronautics community developed and performed a variety of coping 
strategies, most of them fruitless. Three different types of coping efforts can 
be distinguished: 6 
a) Defensive-reactive coping, which tried to maintain the status quo, com-
plaining that the foreseeable predominance of space flight over aeronautics 
was unfair to the aeronautics community. In this futile battle, the advocates 
of aeronautics frequently argued that aeronautics is the real basis of space 
flight, and that, consequently, space flight can only be successful if a solid 
6 Cf. the introduction to this volume by Schimank and Stucke. 
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foundation of aeronautics research exists. But in politics there was no one 
who was willing to adopt this argument. Space was on the agenda! 
b) A second coping strategy which was launched when the institutes recov-
ered from the initial shock over the fatal threat posed by "space" can be 
called half-hearted offensive coping. The aeronautics research institutes 
tried to present themselves to the public and politics as the only compe-
tent partner with adequate experience in the field now ready to step into 
space research. Relabelling the research institutes and some of the (for-
merly pure aeronautical) research fields was part of this effort. This strate-
gy was partially successful: The establishment of new space research insti-
tutes and a concomitant phasing-out of support for aeronautics in favor 
of new competitors could be avoided. It failed, however, in another way: 
The continuation of former (aeronautical) activities under a new Iabel 
proved to be an insufficient tactic when the federal govemment decided 
in June 1961 to participate in European space flight. By then, at the latest, 
the scientists were forced to actually make the switch from aeronautical 
to space research; just talking about space no Ionger sufficed. 
c) An actual reorientation toward space research (as opposed to the tactical 
one described above) is at the heart of the third response, which can be 
labelled as an offensive-preventive coping strategy. The DGF was too 
clumsy and its members too much at odds with one another to adopt this 
strategy. In a sort of double game, the largest single institute - the DVL 
- supported the activities of the DGF, while at the same time trying a 
moreoffensive strategy based on the assumption that only the orientation 
toward specific space projects and not the desire to conduct general basic 
research would provide the research institutes with legitimacy and, hence, 
public funds. The DVL thus proposed to build a,German satellite in coop-
eration with the (emerging) space industry; in November 1962, it present-
ed a detailed project proposal written by the DVL, the aerospace company 
Bölkow and the Meteorological Institute of the University of Cologne. 
This cooperation with the industry can be regarded as a new coping strate-
gy with the intention of reducing the influence of politics on research; 
at the same time, however, it created a new risk of subordinating research 
to industrial priorities. Here, a new network emerged that supplied its 
participants with special advantages over rivals in the respective fields. 
Bölkow (later MBB; now DASA) became the leading aerospace company 
in West Germany, and the DVL advanced to become the undisputed lead-
Space Policy in West Germany 349 
er in extrauniversity aeronautics research. The DGF tried to pursue this 
strategy, too: Together with the Association of German Aeronautical In-
dustry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Luftfahrtindustrie, BDLI), the 
spokesman of the aviation companies, it bad established the Committee 
on Space Technology (Kommission für Raumfahrttechnik, KfR) in August 
1961. This Iobby organization's purposewas to influence the initial politi-
cal decisions on the West German and European space program. But it 
was not until July 1962 that a first, very preliminary program proposal 
could be presented by the KfR. This proposal sank into oblivion very 
rapidly only a few months later when the Bölkow-DVL satellite appeared; 
the threat of a complete Europeanization of the West German space pro-
gram, which would probably mean increasing amounts of German marks 
flowing into French or British research institutes and lower expenditures 
for national programs on aeronautics research, produced a new kind of 
trouble the KfR was unable to cope with. As has been shown in more 
detail elsewhere, the Bölkow-DVL satellite was an adequate means to 
cope with this trouble and to redirect the federal funds into building up 
West German aerospace companies and research institutes? 
3.5 The Final Step: The Establishment of the First West German 
Research Ministry 
In the 1950s, the field of aeronautical research was a kind of testing ground 
for essential instruments of govemmental control of research. Furthermore, 
the organizational prerequisites for translating programmatic political goals 
into research were created when the big science center, DGF, was established. 
This fulfilled two of the conditions required for space flight to be classified 
as big science; what was stilllacking was the industrial underpinning. It was 
the Minister of Defense at that time, Pranz Josef Strauß, who was the main 
driving force behind the development of the aerospace industry and, hence, 
the establishment of the paradigm of an industrial policy that was not market-
directed - a story which cannot be presented here in detail. Finally, the 
French and British initiatives to launch a European space program triggered 
7 cf. Weyer (1993a: 280-315). 
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the formal establishment of space policy in West Germany, which then be-
came one of the responsibilities of the new Ministry for Scientific Research 
(Bundesministeriumfor wissenschaftliche Forschung, BMwF), founded in De-
cember 1962.8 Since the mid-1960s, the policy field "space flight" has been 
govemed by a triad of research ministry, space industry and big science cen-
ters which has even influenced the style of research policy in other fields. 
Although this institutional structure bad been established by goal-oriented 
behavior of the participating actors, the actual shape it eventually took had 
been intended by no one. By the end of the 1960s, this constellation had 
acquired a dynamic of its own, increasingly becoming a constraint for its 
participants and influencing their freedom of action. Thus, the social network 
itself became a source of trouble. 
4 Conclusion 
4.1 Winners and Losers in the History of West German Space Policy 
The history of West German space policy in the 1950s and 1960s reveals that 
hardly any of the initial actors who had contributed significantly to the cre-
ation of a particular aspect of the network were able to profit from their suc-
cess. Coping efforts employed by the respective actors usually caused new 
trouble, resulting from the autodynamics of actor networks, but at the same 
time created new opportunities, which mostly could only be exploited by other 
actors who proceeded to play a major role in the next part of the sequence. 
Thus, several of the actors named above disappeareCl from the network com-
pletely or were forced into the periphery (hobby rocket builders, the Länder, 
the transpoft ministry). In other cases, there was a strange mixture of success 
and failure (the aeronautics research institutes, the aerospace industry, the 
defense ministry). These examples of successful failure or unintended success 
confirm the hypothesis formulated in the introduction: The success of social 
strategies results from the exploitation of situational opportunities as well as 
from the networking of various actors. At the same time, these strategies give 
8 Cf. Krige (1993), Stucke (1993b). 
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rise to an autodynamics of social networks whose consequences may well 
conflict with the intentions of the participants and which, as a result, are often 
judged negatively by the initial actors. Although the networks are created 
strategically, unintended structural effects issue from them which can result 
in the failure of the manifest strategies of the founders of the network. 
One reason why the participating actors continue to play the game despite 
its having unintended consequences is that, having begun it, they cannot give 
it up without abandoning themselves. The special advantages they have gained 
over their various opponents depend on the - continued - existence of the 
network. This means that maintenance of the troublesome network can be-
come an independent rationale for playing the game. 
4.2 Trouble as a Permanent Condition 
Summing up, the history of extrauniversity aeronautics research in the 1950s 
can be reconstructed as a brilliant success story, but the winner of this game 
had lost so much of its former identity that it feit like a loser. In 1950, there 
were six autonomaus aeronautics associations lacking in resources, institutes 
and funding but, at the same time, free of political control. By the mid-1960s, 
they had tumed into one unified, well-equipped, politically directed, quasi 
state-run agency for research in a field that was dominated by the require-
ments of European space technology instead of the inner logic of basic aero-
nautical research. 
Despite twenty years of nonstop coping efforts, trouble never decreased; 
on the contrary, the coping strategy of networking, which can be detected 
at every stage of the development, always produced new, usually greater 
trouble. Extemal troublesuch as the emergence of a European space program 
and intemal trouble such as the unintended effects of networking (between 
the transport ministry and aeronautics research, for example) sometimes rein-
forced each other, as has been shown in detail in the case study. Trouble does 
not seem to be an extraordinary state, but the normal business of social actors 
who act strategically and are, at the same time, the Jocus of other actors' 
Strategie activities. The interactive character of social action proves to be a 
major source of trouble which in general allows only two meta coping strate-
gies: exiting the policy field or continuing the game, which usually requires 
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an actor to change its own identity and adapt its aspiration level to the chang-
ing context.9 
4.3 Coping Activities as a Source of Trouble 
What theoretical conclusions can be drawn from the case presented above? 
a) To begin with, we can conceptualize social organizations such as minis-
tries, science associations, and research institutes as social actors which 
pursue organizational interests and develop strategies to achieve their 
objectives. Whether these strategies are rational or not, measured by a 
quasi-objective criterion of social rationality, does not matter in this con-
text; the strategies must, at the very moment of their conception, be con-
sidered (by the respective actor) to be adequate, i.e. the best alternative 
available for accomplishing the aims that have been set. Which alternative 
is the best depends largely on the options available within the social con-
text, which in turn are products of actions of other co-players. Thus, the 
foundations of actors' decision making vary in the course of social inter-
action. 
b) The chances of actors' strategies being realized and, ultimately, successful 
can be related to their ability to establish social networks, which must 
be regarded as a very important base of social innovations. The opportuni-
ties to profit from network dynamics, however, are inevitably connected 
with its risks, which largely result from the fact, that- as frequently men-
tioned above - networks can develop autodynamics and thus produce 
social constraints which run counter to the actors' initial intentions. 
c) Assuming these conclusions are accurate, we can distinguish between two 
kinds of trouble and two types of coping with trouble. Trouble may be 
produced by externalforces outside the respective actor's sphere ofinflu-
ence, which are usually a surprise and can hardly be anticipated. This 
applies for example to the initiatives to launch a European space program, 
which were triggered by Sputnik and other events that could not have 
been anticipated in the mid-1950s. On the other hand, trouble may be the 
internal product of network dynamics, as was shown, for example, in the 
9 Cf. the introduction to this volume by Schimank and Stucke. 
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analysis of the interaction of the aeronautics community and the transport 
rninistry. Here trouble is not caused by unforeseeable external forces, but 
is related to an actor's own (risky) decision to join a network and to profit 
from its advantages. 
d) In addition to this distinction between "internal" and "external" (sources 
of) trouble, we can also distinguish between two types of coping strate-
gies: The first type can be called defensive-reactive coping, a behavior 
(not really a strategy!) that only activates organizational energies when 
trouble actually occurs (i.e. when the focal actor has perceived certain 
events and interpreted them as being trouble). The actions of the DGF, 
the umbrella organization of the extrauniversity aeronautics research insti-
tutes in the late 1950s, fall into this category. The second type can be 
called offensive-preventive coping, a strategy that anticipates that some-
where in the future trouble might happen and that it would be advanta-
geaus now, in advance, to equip oneself with (financial, legitimatory and 
other) resources in order to deal with it. The strategy of the DVL, the 
largest aeronautics research institute, to risk going out on a limb and 
cooperating on its own with the aerospace industry can be regarded as 
an example of this type. 
The two points I want to emphasize here are that this very strategy of offen-
sive-preventive coping is one main source of trouble, and that each actor's 
perception that trouble resulting from other actors' offensive measures will 
occur in the future in turn accelerates this process. The mutual assumption 
of offensive activities and the tendency to grasp at every opportunity that 
opens up (even if it cannot be exploited now, but only- presumably- in the 
future) seems to be an important trigger of the autodynamics of the social 
process. In advanced industrial societies in which each actor stands to gain 
from his or her own (risky) decisions, trouble seems tobe more likely than 
stationary equilibrium, which would imply that everyone is satisfied (and 
which, at the same time, means that there is no room for maneuver to im-
prove one 's own position). Coping with trouble and, in so doing, producing 
new trouble - this seems to be an endless evolutionary game with, at best, 
short periods of calm. 
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